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Abstract 
The requirements of good policy-making in JHA are that decision-makers have a clear mandate 
and that those agencies charged with policy implementation are well-managed. Who does what, 
who has responsibility and the lines of accountability should be clear to the public and to 
professional groups affected by the policies. At the most general level, the provision of a clear 
mandate is a constitutional question. The present pillar structure of the EU is unsatisfactory and 
unclear. Should the Constitutional Treaty that was politically adopted at the intergovernmental 
conference (IGC) on 18 June 2004 enter into force as foreseen in 2009, the pillar structure 
would cease to exist, the European Parliament would have a greater role in the co-decision 
procedure (Article III-302) and the European Court of Justice would be conferred the power to 
review and interpret all these policies. In the proposals for the next IGC, the pillar structure 
should be replaced by a simple division of powers – those reserved for the EU, those remaining 
exclusively with the member states and those shared by the EU and the member states in an 
enlarged European Union.  
Whether the system is well-managed depends on the presence of high levels of trust, 
adequate flexibility, good coordination and efficiency in terms of cost and rapidity of 
response to requests for information and cooperation. These qualities are also basic to 
assessing convergence and divergence between member states in justice and home affairs, 
requiring refinement and re-definition to apply to specific concerns in this policy area. They 
help to provide the analytical tools needed for introducing greater clarity in policy 
discussions. Despite the complexity of the intellectual debates devoted to these concepts, 
communicating some ideas from these debates in language that is accessible to policy-makers 
is overdue. 
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Introduction 
Cooperation in justice and home affairs (JHA), a policy area once considered to be only 
slowly evolving in the direction of Europeanisation, has recently become one of the most 
dynamic policy domains in the EU. The 1999 Tampere European Council provided the 
necessary political boost for intensifying collaboration among member states on immigration 
and asylum policy as well as on police and judicial cooperation. The Treaty of Amsterdam 
gave the European Commission a mandate, shared with the member states, to make proposals 
for translating the broad political objectives outlined in the Treaty into specific policy 
measures. The events of 11 September 2001, followed by increasing public concern over 
illegal immigration, strengthened the political resolve of the member states to overcome 
differences and proceed faster with the implementation of common initiatives. This was 
reinforced further by events of 11 March 2004 in Madrid.  
After the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 1 May 1999, the field of visas, 
asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons came under the 
first pillar, under the jurisdiction of European Community law under Title IV of the EC treaty 
(Arts. 61-69). Although decisions must be taken unanimously during a transition period of 
five years after the entry into force of the Treaty (1999–2004), they have direct effect in the 
member states. Public order and internal security (policing and judicial cooperation) remain in 
the third pillar, governed by an intergovernmental method, but with modifications to make 
decision-making more efficient. An area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) therefore had 
to be implemented in this five-year period. 
Despite the peculiarities of the present institutional structure of the EU (JHA is present in 
three pillars), policies falling under the rubric of justice and home affairs are not arbitrarily 
grouped together. They have important inter-connections and changes in one policy can have 
important consequential effects on other policies. Nevertheless, they are usually analysed 
separately (for a valuable exception see Monar, 2000) by specialists in different disciplines – 
lawyers, political scientists, sociologists and economists – or through multi-disciplinary 
approaches in particular areas such as immigration, police studies, approximation of laws or 
the constitutional/institutional architecture of the EU. There is already considerable literature 
on police cooperation, border checks, immigration control, free movement, Eurojust and the 
approximation of laws in criminal matters but this is either firmly within the confines of 
particular disciplines or is only an ephemeral contribution to the continuing policy debate. 
This fragmentation would change if there was greater constitutional clarity in the EU. 
At the same time as creating an area of freedom, security and justice, the EU has announced 
the firm intention to accept new member states. This enlargement of the EU will increase the 
cultural, social and economic diversity of the Union and place strains on its decision-making 2 | JOANNA APAP 
processes. The southern and eastern enlargement of the EU is the first enlargement that 
involves significant cooperation in JHA. Furthermore, this is occurring at a critical moment 
for the implementation of new initiatives at the EU level. The coincidence of these 
developments poses a major challenge for member states, which are confronted with the 
necessity to strengthen collaboration among themselves and at the same time incorporate new 
members in the EU decision-making structures, making agreement on common actions 
potentially more difficult   
Cooperation in JHA differs from other policy areas (with minor exceptions) in the EU 
because it involves the continuing and increasingly intensive cooperation between 
government agencies in the member states. It involves policy convergence and approximation 
of laws. It is a particularly difficult form of cooperation because of sensitivities about 
sovereignty and the diversity in the legal systems of the member states (and of candidate 
countries).  
Making the system work 
Inadequate levels of trust, inflexibility, poor coordination and inefficiencies in terms of poor 
value for money and the slow operation of systems potentially lead to serious friction between 
member states or hostility from sections of public opinion towards the European Union. All 
these present very difficult practical problems, but in order to tackle them, a common 
language about them is essential. Conceptual clarification is the sine qua non of good 
management in this area. 
The concept of trust 
Trust is the most difficult of these concepts and vastly different opinions exist concerning the 
basis of trust. Its meaning has been widely debated in philosophy and the social sciences 
(particularly since the work of Émile Durkheim on education, professional ethics, 
individualism and socialism). More recently, it has been important in discussions of social 
capital. Social theorists do not agree on whether it is a property of individuals, social 
relationships or social systems.  
Trust is a crucially important quality of the relations between individuals who are members of 
the same family, live in the same locality, members of the same professional group or 
organisation, have market relationships or who are members of the same national society. 
According to N. Luhman, “Without trust only very simple forms of human cooperation, 
which can be transacted on the spot, are possible” (Luhman, 1979). Trust is essential for 
maintaining stable relationships and is vital for the maintenance of cooperation. 
Trust can be seen as a mechanism for solving collective action problems because cooperation 
based on trust exists irrespective of sanctions or rewards. Trust rests on beliefs about people 
reacting or not reacting in certain ways; it requires reciprocity and moral obligation, which 
exist to the extent that individuals share values and norms. The utilitarian approach in which 
trust is established by the self-interested actions of rational individuals is unsatisfactory. 
Cooperation based on a rational calculation of costs and benefits cannot go beyond the 
specific short-term objectives that bring the parties together. A ‘culture of trust’ should be the 
basis of EU-wide cooperation in JHA. 
Also central to this policy area, the idea of trust underpins the debate about the ‘risk society’ – 
and assessment of risk is now at the core of planning internal security policies. In particular, 
the changing nature of risk and its implications for contemporary politics and society has TOWARDS CLOSER PARTNERSHIPS | 3 
become an important debate in social sciences. Modernisation, as Ulrich Beck and Anthony 
Giddens argue, has produced unintended risks, which are now a primary preoccupation of 
citizens and policy-makers. Awareness of and anxiety about risk have become ubiquitous in 
contemporary society and are the outcomes of scientific and technological development. 
‘Manufactured uncertainty’ has penetrated everyone’s life as most human activities have 
grown to involve apparently incalculable risks. Political debate, as a consequence, has been 
transformed and is increasingly concerned with the management of risks.  
These changes, while presenting difficult challenges to policy-makers, offer opportunities as 
well. High levels of insecurity in a risk society encourage bridge-building between people, 
cultures and nations along with efforts to increase trust in search of ways to better control risk. 
The notion of trust, therefore, becomes essential to any policy effort intended to create 
security in a risk society. This notion does not just mean a shift in the discourse on safety 
provision but a radical departure in the way actors engage in policy-making and collaborate to 
achieve results. Risk management requires more profound involvement with counterparts and 
partners in an effort to overcome what Beck refers to as the state of “organised 
irresponsibility”. 
To take the example of police cooperation, in a society characterised by ‘risk abundance’ 
police agencies are increasingly more concerned with producing knowledge related to risk 
and communicating it to other agencies across borders. Information sharing, therefore, 
becomes a critical element of the risk-management system, yet it is not feasible without 
adequate levels of trust between actors irrespective of national background and functional 
specialisation.  
Yet belief in the virtues of trust is neither uniformly nor universally shared. Shared values and 
norms are often built through institutions that express common bonds. Institutions can reduce 
the transaction costs of exchanges among actors, provide information to governments on the 
policy options available, offer opportunities for issue linkages and package deals, and create 
an environment of predictability and stable expectations about future behaviour. Institutions 
provide a benchmark for identity by socialising people so that they have a common 
understanding of policy objectives and methods of achieving them. Trust is part of the 
normative context established through greater interaction among European states and citizens 
through working together in EU institutions.  
Despite institutional integration in Europe (in JHA, of very recent origin), sources of mistrust 
among the EU member states still exist. In the field of JHA, examples of mistrust abound and 
are reminders of the persistent uncertainties of trust. Visas are the expressions of mistrust of 
third countries – until the mid-1980s they reflected a mistrust of governments and now often a 
mistrust of people. Visas and border controls have recently caused mistrust among EU 
institutions, illustrated by cases before the European Court of Justice, and among member 
states over conditions in which visas are issued.  
Lack of trust is apparent in the relations between EU member states and applicant countries 
from Central and Eastern Europe. Apparent double standards on corruption and organised 
crime (member states expecting standards of candidate states that they do not meet 
themselves) are both a manifestation and a cause of mistrust. The difficulties that surfaced in 
the negotiation and implementation of the Schengen Information System II (SIS II) has also 
revealed a level of distrust of the new member states.  
In police cooperation, there is often a failure along the vertical information exchange (local-
national-European) to communicate to the higher level. Further, any evidence of police 4 | JOANNA APAP 
corruption has a destructive effect on trust. The criminal law procedures thought necessary in 
some countries have also had a destructive effect on trust. The use of pre-trial detention in 
some countries for EU nationals from other countries was a cause of misunderstanding that is 
now being addressed.  
Establishing a high level of trust or, to use the Durkheimian term, ‘solidarity’ in police, 
judicial, border control and immigration cooperation cannot be separated from wider issues of 
building a genuine European community. If all EU citizens regarded each other in the same 
way as they presently regard their fellow countrymen/women, then such a community could 
be said to exist. The lack of a genuine ‘European people’ or demos is a problem in this and 
other fields of EU activity. Constitutional and institutional change is a partial contribution to 
overcoming its absence.  
Up-to-date, operationally relevant information requires further development of well-designed 
databases to give information about matters such as procedures, legal requirements, 
operational policies, police organisation and contact persons. The frustrations of not being 
able to quickly find the precise information required on databases are well known. Adequate 
time is probably the most difficult condition to provide. Compared with the compelling 
demands on police time, making space for trust-building in European cooperation may seem a 
nebulous objective to some professional groups, especially the police.  
There is a range of measures that the EU has already embarked upon that could be the basis of 
a trust-building strategy. There is an ever-present tendency to ‘re-invent the wheel’. 
Developing, improving and increasing the resources, where necessary, of existing 
programmes and initiatives are crucial. The first PHARE programme on strengthening drug 
law enforcement in the candidate countries is a good model in one particular respect – police 
officers are sent from member states to advise, supply information and facilitate exchanges. 
This has a federating effect on the member states because they have to present a coordinated 
front to the outside world. The AGIS and ARGO programmes, which provide opportunities 
for improving skills, working across borders and learning from the experience of joint 
operations, are even more promising examples. 
If existing JHA arrangements are to operate effectively, especially in an enlarged EU, higher 
levels of trust must be established. The particular reasons for mistrust are likely to change 
over time but the task is to create conditions in which trust is the norm and mistrust the 
exception. A strategy for trust-building should ensure adequate resources for police and 
magistrates involved in cooperation in terms of knowledge, skills, information and time. The 
first two require upgrading most countries’ training systems. They also depend on the quality 
of the general educational provision in the states particularly for such matters as language 
skills and a general understanding of the European Union.  
The concept of flexibility 
The literature on the concept of flexibility is extremely diverse. Flexibility was popularised in 
the 1980s by economists and specialists in industrial relations in studies of the labour market. 
In the 1990s there was an application of the concept in policy studies, particularly in the 
international arena (Davis & Finch 1993; Jackson et al., 2001). In government and 
administration the idea of flexibility is central to the literature on ‘new public management’, 
particularly in arguments in favour of flexibility to meet client demands (for police, see 
Walker, 2001). The most application of the idea has been to the European Union itself after 
the negotiation of the Treaty of Amsterdam (de Búrca & Scott, 2000; Den Boer & TOWARDS CLOSER PARTNERSHIPS | 5 
Guggenbühl, 1998). A common thread in this diverse literature is that flexibility enables 
individuals and groups (and even states) to adapt to different and changing circumstances in 
order to pursue the same overall objectives. 
A distinction may be drawn between ‘variation’ and ‘flexibility’. Variations in practice occur 
without necessarily being noticed or consciously willed by the people involved. If they are 
noticed, they are regarded negatively when they occur in EU measures with direct effect, e.g. 
the persistent variations in French practice over dates of the hunting season in apparent 
contradiction with an Environmental Directive of 1979. Flexibility, by contrast, may 
deliberately be introduced into practices, procedures and behaviours to produce desired 
outcomes. This application does not imply, as it does in the case of variation, the absence of 
or non-compliance with rules. Rules for flexibility are necessary to regulate when, how and in 
what way departures from a norm are permissible.  
There are various kinds of flexibility in the EU. The first is constitutional or treaty-based. 
Exceptions are allowed to particular member states. These exceptions can take two forms – 
they may allow opt-outs or opt-ins to particular sectors of policy such as the common 
currency or border controls; they may also allow, in the case of enhanced cooperation, a group 
of states (a minimum of eight, according to the Treaty of Amsterdam) to integrate more 
closely while using EU institutions to do so. In the case of EU measures with direct effect, 
derogations for particular states are allowed on specific items when they establish a case that 
the objectives of the measure would not be achieved without such an exception being made. 
In addition, there is institutional flexibility – the establishment of new machinery/units at the 
EU, national and local/regional levels. New institutional practices may allow a more open-
ended conception of the role of EU agencies. Further, the use of guidelines to encourage 
direct cooperation between agencies in member states rather than having it stipulated by EU 
law and regulation can contribute to another layer of flexibility. Finally, there is flexibility in 
the area covered by EU systems, i.e. neighbouring states (for example the Schengen 
Association Agreements with Norway and Iceland and now with Switzerland) may be co-
opted into EU JHA systems. 
The most important form of flexibility in the justice and home affairs area is flexibility in 
implementation of measures. This applies to all instruments used in JHA (for example 
framework decisions, decisions, recommendations, action programmes and conventions), 
excepting those contained in pillar 1 (some civil law legislation and all freedom of movement 
rules). Member states must, for example, have established central offices for the management 
of the Schengen system and for cooperation with Europol, but it is at their discretion how 
these are staffed, by whom and according to what rules of organisation. The concept of 
flexibility can be widened to include multilateral and bilateral agreements, common in the law 
enforcement area, between member states outside the European Union framework and with 
third countries.  
Almost invariably, flexibility has unintended and frequently negative consequences. It is 
potentially in conflict with the other desirable values discussed in this paper. It creates greater 
uncertainty, which can undermine relations of trust since one of the requirements of trust is 
predictable behaviour. Lack of knowledge about how other states are implementing measures 
can create serious suspicions about whether they are implementing them at all. It may 
undermine systems of coordination because it allows very different arrangements in the 
member states for implementing policies – thus who coordinates them with becomes 
problematic. Efficiency can be reduced because in a complex cultural area such as the EU, 
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professional groups, leading to misunderstandings. Also the costs, particularly information 
costs, are likely to increase considerably. Flexibility as now practiced in the EU creates a very 
complex world, raising problems of comprehensibility even for the well-informed. 
Nonetheless flexibility is necessary in JHA cooperation in order to coordinate joint actions, 
implement policies, adapt to changing circumstances and take account of variations in local 
conditions. The absence of flexibility, namely the attempt to impose common harmonised 
standards, would slow down the decision-making process and, in some sensitive areas, would 
block it altogether. Also harmonisation could reduce efficiency in circumstances where there 
are inevitably variations – legal, institutional and geopolitical – between member states, 
which ought to be taken into account. 
New machinery/units at the European Union level – Europol, Schengen, Eurojust, the 
European Police Academy, Police Chiefs Task Force and the European Anti-Fraud Office 
(OLAF) – illustrate the advantages and some of the drawbacks of EU institutional flexibility. 
New initiatives will doubtlessly be proposed from time to time. The existing initiatives and 
the possibility of new ones demonstrate the adaptability of the EU but once the 
machinery/units are in place they add an element of rigidity to the EU system, since they 
develop institutional interests in their survival and in the development of their influence and 
field of activity. These often co-exist with older forms of cooperation/communication 
established outside the European Union framework, but rationalisation is difficult because of 
the difficulties of abolishing institutions or regular practices that have worked reasonably 
well. 
One form of flexibility within member states is that a new remit for national institutions often 
follows, with lags, from Europeanisation or changes in the international system. The most 
commented upon has been the partial re-conversion of security services from espionage or 
counter-espionage against other countries to combating international crime and terrorism. 
Some changes in remit have been the direct outcome of Europeanisation. Occasionally, they 
have proven unsuccessful (as the temporary conversion of the French PAF – Police de l’Air et 
des Frontières to the DICCILEC – Direction Centrale de la Lutte contre l’Immigration et le 
Travail Clandestine) and a step backwards has been taken. The extent to which a change in 
remit is possible varies across the European Union member states. This adds a new layer of 
complexity to the effects of flexibility. 
New techniques in information and communication technologies often result in flexibility 
because they provide new possibilities of data storage, analysis and transmission. These 
techniques are diffused quickly but adopted unevenly across the member states and the 
candidate countries. In certain areas, police techniques such as fingerprint searches, DNA 
testing and analyses of firearms are more standardised, partly for financial reasons. Where 
they are not, the Trevi group had (and now Europol has) a responsibility to disseminate ‘best 
practice’ but practical constraints, such as budgets, mean that there is large variation in 
practice. Exactly how much variation is not systematically established. The question of what 
flexibility (or permissible variation) is desirable has not yet been posed. 
Redeployment and re-training of personnel is one of the difficult preconditions of flexibility 
of police, magistrates, immigration officials and personnel of ministries of justice and the 
interior. The difficulty relates to the time constraints of these professionals, their conservatism 
and esprit de corps, along with certain political blockages.  
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The JHA programme AGIS (a follow-up to, among others, the OISIN programme) mainly 
addresses the training aspect of the problem. Its objectives are inter alia to 
•  raise language skills and knowledge of legal and operational terminology; 
•  promote awareness of legislation and operational procedures through training, exchanges 
and study visits; 
•  organise joint operational projects; 
•  organise briefings and debriefings of joint operational projects; and 
•  provide information, training, research, operational studies and evaluation. 
The concept of flexibility, which has several dimensions, is an essential tool in managing any 
complex system. An assessment of flexibility in the context of JHA policies should be both 
part of the quality audit and the monitoring of implementation of JHA policies, both of which 
are recommended below. 
The concept of coordination 
Coordination can be defined as “the actions of separate individuals or organisations – which 
are not in pre-existing harmony – [are] brought into conformity with one another through 
negotiations” (Krasner, 1983, p. 1; Keohane, 1984, p. 51). There are two types of 
coordination, analytically distinct, though in practice inseparable – political coordination and 
administrative/managerial coordination. Until the present time, the former has been 
incommensurably more important in JHA, because most policies agreed had the character of 
guidelines. It remained the exclusive responsibility of the member states to implement them, 
thus avoiding issues of administrative/managerial coordination at the EU level. With the 
establishment of Schengen, Europol, Eurojust and the European Police Academy, together 
with the more informal but continuing arrangements such as the European Judicial Network 
and the Working Group of Chiefs of Police, managerial coordination within and between 
these entities will assume an ever-increasing importance. 
In the field of justice and home affairs, policy coordination fluctuates over time as a result of 
a shift in interests and loyalties of the main actors. The analytical framework provided by the 
pendulum model proposed by Helen Wallace (Wallace, 1996, p. 13) is useful in 
understanding this fluctuation. Wallace suggests the metaphor of a pendulum oscillating 
between two magnetic fields, one that is nationally based and the other one that is 
transnationally or supranationally oriented (Figure 1). The transnational policy arena is 
located around the EU institutions, whereas the national-level governance is the member state, 
but in some Western European countries there are also minor magnetic fields at regional and 
local levels. The probability of adoption of national or transnational policies depends on the 
relative strength of the magnetic fields. If both sides are weak, then no coherent policy will 
emerge either at transnational or national levels. The movement of the pendulum encapsulates 
the process of EU integration, at times regular, other times irregular, at times oscillating and 
at some instances stationary. 
The model is based on three premises: 
•  the EU states are politically inadequate; 
•  globalisation has a significant impact; and 
•  the European region has specific features.  8 | JOANNA APAP 
Figure 1. Pendulum model on policy coordination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Choices between national policy and various forms of transnational collaboration are subject 
to political competition and are thus inherently unstable. An example is in immigration 
policy: member states have very different expectations and traditions with regard to this issue 
and wish to control it, but pressures and incentives accumulate for strengthening collective 
European action, giving the transnational field at least a temporary advantage. But this model 
suggests that neither field will win a decisive or permanent victory. For example, 
notwithstanding the common challenges relating to policy towards resident third-country 
nationals in the EU and immigration, policies in the various EU member states have 
continued to remain different from each other to a certain extent. In this and other fields, 
evolving arrangements are conceived as a set of similar policies, so that national sovereignty 
and prerogatives need not be infringed. As one Commission official put it, “a great deal of 
time [is] spent negotiating legal texts which [are] later watered down to carry as little legal 
obligation as possible to ensure they are acceptable to all member states”. 
Thus Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty confirmed intergovernmental cooperation as the proper 
way to deal with JHA matters. In addition, the Treaty failed to define whether the aim of 
justice and home affairs cooperation was to provide for or encourage legal initiatives (or 
both), or rather develop a practical, operational cooperation (Den Boer, 1996). Its economic 
provisions increased pressure towards collective EU measures in other fields, creating 
conditions for further integration in JHA. To borrow Helen Wallace’s words, this allowed 
“ideas and interests [to become] congruent and shared across borders and hence mutually 
compatible and reinforcing”. The potential for policies at a transnational level was embodied 
in the Treaty of Amsterdam, but this was the case only with regard to some issues. The TOWARDS CLOSER PARTNERSHIPS | 9 
Tampere Conclusions and the accompanying scoreboard, together with the Commission’s 
right of initiative in the JHA area, are important new instruments of policy coordination. But 
they are far from settling the issue: the pendulum between state-centred and EU-level 
solutions is likely to go on swinging for some time. 
In terms of administrative/managerial coordination, the EU level is in a peculiar position 
because it lacks most of the means of coordination available in national administration or has 
them only in a weak form. According to Ernest R. Alexander, who adopts a rational choice 
approach, “for an organisation to agree to participate in a coordinated effort, the prospective 
rewards of inter-organisational cooperation must be greater than its costs, risk or threat to the 
organisation or relevant vested interest within it” (Alexander, 1995, p. 1). The state can 
manipulate the costs and rewards of units to achieve good coordination. This is done by 
budgetary and accounting controls, judgements of administrative courts, opinions of 
administrative advisory bodies and pressure from inter-ministerial committees eventually 
backed by executive decisions taken at the political level. But the purpose of coordination at 
the national level is not benefit-maximising for the agencies involved. Consistency of policy 
and policy implementation is regarded as a political necessity for governments. 
The coordinating instruments evident at the state level are either not present at the EU level or 
present in a diluted form. EU intergovernmental agencies are financed by intergovernmental 
means and are not subject to EU budgetary controls. Many EU-financed programmes in JHA 
are co-financed by the member states, over which the EU can exercise partial budgetary 
controls. The EU Court of Auditors has emerged as a powerful form of control wherever EU 
funds are involved. The European Court of Justice of First Instance is a rapidly expanding 
administrative jurisdiction but it is by no means the equivalent of the French Conseil d’Etat 
either as an administrative court or an administrative advisory body. Joint working parties and 
joint meetings have acquired an important role in coordinating practices, although they are not 
the equivalent of inter-ministerial committees at the national level.  
JHA institutions and agencies are, however, of such relatively recent creation that 
coordination between them has not yet surfaced as a pressing issue. There are concerns about 
the overlap between Europol and the Schengen system, which is stimulating the first 
discussions of coordination. It is too early to advance highly developed schemes of what 
ought to be the over-arching coordinating mechanisms in the JHA area. But a systematic 
enquiry ought to be made into the problems involved in conjunction with assessments of 
management efficiency within the agencies. 
The concept of efficiency 
The European Commission has made a practice of commissioning evaluation reports on 
specific programmes from panels of experts or management consultants. These are based on 
both qualitative and quantitative analysis. ‘Value for money’ and ‘efficiency’ are concepts 
frequently used. Both (and particularly the latter) are slippery notions and alleged misuse of 
them can cause angry reactions from the groups being assessed. The two main professional 
groups most involved in JHA, police and magistrates, are particularly sensitive about attempts 
to apply these concepts to their activities. Efficiency is desirable in JHA cooperation but what 
this means should be carefully reviewed; different kinds of efficiency criteria should be 
developed, which should be easily comprehensible and avoid technical complexity. 
Efficiency is a concept that has been a particular preoccupation of economists. Pareto made 
the most influential contribution to the definition of efficiency in his discussion of 10 | JOANNA APAP 
maximising welfare, positing that an efficient outcome is one that makes some people better 
off without worsening the situation for others. Pareto-optimal policy solutions bring 
additional net benefits for some of the parties concerned while not incurring costs to others. 
Agreeing on a cooperative JHA policy solution that meets the Pareto-efficient criteria may be 
politically unsustainable. Policy-makers at the political level are rarely concerned with 
efficiency only – often they scarcely take it into account. Calculations of national interest 
along with political/electoral impacts are often given much higher priority. Nevertheless, the 
assessment of policies in terms of Pareto optimality is a valuable reminder to the highest level 
of decision-makers that other criteria exist. 
Currently, benchmarks for efficient policy in this field do not exist, although the Tampere 
scoreboard provides a yardstick for efficient policy-making (in the sense of whether decisions 
are taken in a timely manner). The Tampere Presidency Conclusions of 1999 and the Tampere 
scoreboard are the boldest and the most far-reaching documents approved by all member 
states. The former laid out a broad vision for “a union of freedom, security and justice” and 
called for specific common actions in four broad areas: asylum and migration policy, justice, 
fight against crime, external policy vis-à-vis third countries (European Commission, 2001). It 
put forward a strategy on what objectives the EU should pursue and what instruments it 
should seek to acquire within the clear timeframe set out in the scoreboard. It also introduced 
a biannual review process, conducted by the Commission, of the progress achieved. 
Justified criticisms of the slow progress in implementation of the Tampere scoreboard have 
been made. In its review of the second half of 2001, the Commission, however, emphasises 
the major advance in the “general acceptance of the concept of mutual recognition of Court 
judgements as a practical way of overcoming deeply embedded differences in member states’ 
judicial traditions and structures” (European Commission, 2001). It nevertheless expresses 
regrets for the failure to meet the Tampere deadlines in specific areas involving new 
legislation. The biggest danger arising from such delays, in the Commission’s view, is the 
formulation and implementation of national policies with little or no consideration of the 
European dimension and the lack of interest in member states for further regulation at EU 
level. Undoubtedly, taking decisions in a timely way is an important element in assessing the 
efficiency of EU initiatives in JHA.  
Even in the area of immigration and asylum, where the ‘pillar switch’ (from the third to the 
first pillar) was expected to create a momentum for improved and more efficient decision-
making, progress has been slow. The reasons are that unanimity rule is still required for most 
decisions and political will for making concessions and speeding up negotiations has been 
lacking. Abandoning the unanimity rule in blocked areas would be an efficiency gain. The 
timely manner in which the Commission proposes legislation is not yet sufficient to ensure 
positive results in the immigration and asylum policy domain. 
The implementation of the Tampere scoreboard is further impeded by the complexities of 
enlargement, which can be the enemy of efficiency. The JHA acquis is constantly evolving 
and confronting applicant countries with difficulties in adapting to ever-changing demands 
and complying with legislation with far-reaching consequences. That is not to say that 
enlargement is an obstacle for achieving an AFSJ, but it does introduce additional strains in 
JHA policy-making and policy implementation. Considering the intricacies of accession 
negotiations, reasonable expectations need to be set for benchmarks in JHA.   
Cost-benefit analysis is an important way of assessing efficiency and has the advantage that a 
large resource of practitioner experience is available. It has limited but useful application in 
the JHA field to specific activities of particular agencies. Quality audits developed by TOWARDS CLOSER PARTNERSHIPS | 11 
agencies such as the UK Audit Commission are to a large extent based on it. It can be applied 
to the Schengen Information System, intelligence analysis by Europol, requests for advice and 
assistance from Eurojust and so on. Published quality audit reports would provide useful 
management tools to the agencies concerned and provide useful publicity for the good work 
they are doing. It is, however, important that rigorous cost benefit/quality audits are not 
applied in the initial stages of setting up agencies. There should be an initial period that 
directors and managers have to experiment and to adjust resources available to the strategic 
objectives set for them. The various public agencies envisaged by Tampere such as Eurojust, 
the Police Chiefs Task Force, the European Police College (CEPOL) have been established 
and to varying degrees commenced operations, but it is too early to impose a quality audit, as 
opposed to an accounts audit.  
More generally, efficiency has to be assessed in terms of fundamental but intangible criteria 
such as building trust among member states, allowing for flexibility in policy formulation and 
implementation, and taking into consideration the feasibility of convergence among member 
states in the specific sub-fields of JHA cooperation. What is needed is an evaluation that is 
both pragmatic and imaginative on what is achievable given the existing constraints. This 
evaluation should be developed by an observatory on the implementation of JHA policy. The 
establishment of such an observatory will be one of the principle objectives of the 
forthcoming FP6 Integrated Project, CHALLENGE, which will build upon the work of the 
current FP5 project, ELISE. 
Some institutional features of the EU have impacts on efficiency, partly because they make 
the system less consolidated than it should be. Changing the EU presidency brings new 
priorities to the agenda of the Council every six months and JHA issues are not always a top 
priority. Indeed, the Commission has been consistent in its efforts to develop a coherent 
strategy for different issue areas of JHA. Yet many proposals tabled by the Commission are 
delayed, pending approval by the Council of Ministers. Unanticipated events can disrupt 
consistency and continuity in the policy process as the events of 11 September 2001 and 11 
March 2004 in Madrid have amply demonstrated.  
Recommendations 
1.  The EU Commission should propose a trust-building strategy in JHA, which should 
include all the professional groups involved in the member states. In the first instance, this 
should be done by evaluating and coordinating existing policies that contribute to trust-
building. 
2.  A quality audit should accompany an audit of accounts for the EU agencies involved in 
JHA. This quality audit should include specialists in management, public administration, 
cultural anthropology and social psychology, as well as those from member states with 
experience in quality audits. 
3.  Research should be commissioned on the requirements for cooperative arrangements 
among EU agencies in JHA, with a view to proposing instruments of coordination and 
assessing whether any changes in the remit of the agencies are desirable. 
4.  An independent observatory for monitoring the implementation of JHA policy should be 
established, which should publicise best practice as well as indicate omissions. This 
observatory should be managed by a small board appointed by the European Council and 
consist of individuals drawn from the world of practice as well as acknowledged 
authorities on EU policies. | 12 
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